Cabo Verde - Perda de Soberania em Política Externa.

A República de Cabo Verde perdeu já a sua soberania em matéria de política externa e começam a ser visíveis sinais que indicam que, em certos sectores da sociedade, uma perda de soberania no plano interno seria desejável (para eles). Para exemplificar o que acabo de dizer em matéria de política externa basta apontar 3 casos paradigmáticos: 1. O reconhecimento da soberania maroquina sobre o Sahara Ocidental; A detenção e extradição do cidadão Venezuelano Saab e os recentes votos na AGO sobre o processo de estabelecimento de um cessar-fogo humanitário em Gaza, na Palestina ocupada. No caso Saab, dispomos hoje de um testemunho documental da maior importância produzido por não menos que o antigo Secretário da Defesa da Administração Trump. Segue um extrato das memórias deste referido Senhor para que cada um possa avaliar qual o grau de dependência e subserviência a que Cabo Verde chegou. Segue o extrato em lingua inglesa.

Citação:

ESPER (Mark T.). A Sacred Oath. Memoirs of a Secretary of Defense during extraordinary Times. William Morrow editors, New York, 2022. Pgs. 250-254

Meanwhile, I continued my weekly NDS implementation meetings throughout June—we had to keep pressing forward. Moreover, with all of the craziness going on in Washington, D.C., I needed to keep the Pentagon focused on more productive things and not get distracted. As such, I held a series of meetings on issues ranging from the reassignment of joint forces around the world, an update to our directed force readiness tables, COVID, and Operation Warp Speed to another iteration of the China war plan and a discussion on the structure of the Space Force.

“The issue of preparing military options to strike Venezuela didn’t raise its head again that summer. State and Justice’s successful seizure played a positive role in suppressing this urge coming out of the White House. Other matters—namely, civil unrest—were consuming the president’s attention.

This newest armed service—Space Force—was responsible for the organizing, manning,  training, and equipping of U.S. military capabilities focused on this new domain of warfare. It was a bold initiative that would fundamentally change, in a positive way, the DoD’s approach to protecting space, and our ability to operate there. This was so vitally important to our

security, economy, and way of life, given that the Chinese and Russians were weaponizing space as an asymmetric counter to our conventional dominance.

I was proud to establish the Space Force in December 2019 and play an active role in its development. It was a historic accomplishment for the Air Force, the DoD, and the country. All of these matters were the issues I really enjoyed working on, and the ones that would make an enduring difference for the nation’s security.

One issue did arise in July that caught the attention of the Venezuela hawks, and it would eventually create more friction with the Pentagon. In early June, the government of Cape Verde arrested a Colombian businessman by the name of Alex Saab at the request of the United States on money laundering charges, which he denied. They did so during a layover he had in the archipelago, which is located in the Atlantic Ocean hundreds of miles off the coast of West Africa.

At Maduro’s direction, Saab was reportedly on a special mission to negotiate a deal with Iran for Venezuela to receive more fuel, food, and medical supplies. Saab was Maduro’s long-standing point man when it came to crafting the economic deals and other transactions that were keeping the regime afloat. The U.S. government was seeking his extradition. As such, this small island country detained Saab as judicial proceedings began. Saab was a very important player, and access to him could really help explain how Maduro and his regime worked. It was important to get custody of him. This could provide a real road map for the U.S. government to unravel the Venezuelan government’s illicit schemes and bring them to justice. Maduro knew this as well, so a full court press was under way by Caracas to get Saab released.

Jorge Arreaza, Venezuela’s foreign minister, said at the time that Cape Verde’s detention of Saab was “violating international norms and law” and promised to do everything possible to protect him. Comments like this really spooked the officials at State, Justice, and the NSC who were working this case. By mid-July, a variety of rumors were circulating in the interagency: Maduro persuaded President Putin to send Russian special forces to spring Saab from jail; Russian mercenaries in Libya were going to travel hundreds of miles in small boats to either rescue or kill Saab; Venezuelan intelligence was chartering a special plane to fly to Cape Verde to repatriate Saab; and, Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops were preparing similar rescue missions.

It seemed that somebody was watching too many Mission: Impossible movies on the weekend. I never saw intelligence that backed any of it up. But as night follows day, these rumors prompted a request for action from the DoD, which I was told came from the State Department. I couldn’t believe State was requesting an Amphibious Readiness Group-Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) be dispatched immediately from the Mediterranean to Cape Verde to protect Saab and deter intervention from the Russians, Iranians, and anyone else interested in disrupting the judicial proceedings.

I also felt it was important to extradite Saab back to the United States. However, if there was ever an example of the old saying “swatting a fly with a sledgehammer,” this was it. Except that . . . there was no proof that the fly even existed, and the hammer was as large as a carnival mallet.

Most troubling was that nobody could answer the most basic questions. How would the expeditionary unit protect Saab? How would it deter action? Did we have permission to put Marines ashore to safeguard him? Did we have permission to intercept any Russian, Iranian, or Venezuelan aircraft or ships that looked suspicious? How would Cape Verde react to such a large military presence? The questions went on and on and on.

As I was preparing for the June 2020 NATO Defense Ministerial, I asked my senior military assistant, Lieutenant General Bryan Fenton, to track this action down and update me. In my mind, this was not simply another case of using the DoD “easy button”; it was misuse of the armed forces, another one of my new redlines. I picked up the phone and called O’Brien. He was obviously aware of Saab’s detention and some of the rumors floating around, but not about the ARG-MEU request. “Robert,” I said, “what’s being proposed by State is ridiculous. Pulling thirty-five-hundred-plus Marines and sailors, and several ships out of the Mediterranean to sail around an island in circles is a major waste of scarce capabilities.”

“You’re right, Mark,” he replied, and then asked, “What can we do to help here?” Before I could respond, he added, “By the way, DOJ is asking about deploying U.S. military special operators to Cape Verde to protect Saab.” How equally fatuous. I went through many of the same questions I had with my team: “Will Cape Verde support the deployment of U.S. forces? Will they allow our people to carry weapons? What is their authority once they arrive?” These and more were all critical questions, yet we had not even asked Cape Verde any of them yet, let alone had answers to them. To his credit, O’Brien got it.

I then said, “Why we are even talking about military options? This is a law enforcement and diplomatic action. We should be engaging on those tracks, and at the highest levels. Why not inform Cape Verde of what we’re hearing, and ask them to beef up their own security?” If they can’t do it, I suggested, “then maybe we can provide federal marshals, DEA agents, State Department diplomatic security, or whatever law enforcement or civilian security teams are more appropriate to the task.” O’Brien listened patiently.

I kept up my line of reasoning, trying to maneuver us into a better approach: “If for some reason we truly assessed the need for a naval presence, I said, why not get the U.S. Coast Guard to support? They have a law enforcement role, after all.” These were all reasonable and

straightforward questions, I thought. However, with fundamentally different views regarding the nature and scope of the problem, the various departments had developed wildly different solutions. When I was done, O’Brien said State and Justice were “really concerned, and some in Cape Verde are as well.” He heard that the government in the capital of Praia “doesn’t want this hot potato” and was doing everything they could to keep a low profile. This meant “limiting the U.S. presence” in Cape Verde, which buttressed my position. According to him, “they would appreciate any assistance we can provide to help them improve their own capabilities,” beginning with “assistance to repair a couple of their own coastal patrol ships.”

This started making more sense, but the U.S. Coast Guard said they couldn’t do it—“no cutters are available right now” was what we were told — so I committed to get my folks at U.S. Africa Command on the mission. I also tasked AFRICOM to look at ways “to help the country improve its domain awareness,” which was another concern of Cape Verde. In August 2020, a Coast Guard ship eventually performed a joint patrol with the Cape Verdean Coast Guard to ostensibly monitor and enforce fishing rights.

Within a couple of days, this issue died down, but it wouldn’t be the end of it. By mid-October, it was back, with reporting coming out of Cape Verde that the government might soon release Saab or move him to house arrest.

State was pushing again for a U.S. Navy ship to patrol around Cape Verde and deter any outside intervention. The Coast Guard once again couldn’t provide any cutters in a timely manner. I raised this with Pompeo during a call on October 19, but he said he wasn’t aware of this latest issue. Mike was always reasonable on these things, so I didn’t believe he supported this idea, but he probably wouldn’t oppose it if the DoD agreed to move forward.

I made it clear that I opposed deploying a Navy warship.

When James Anderson, my Policy head, came to brief me on this issue before the NSC deputies committee meeting he was attending that week, I told him, “I don’t support the proposed action. They first have to show me some evidence that Russia, Iran, or Venezuela is planning to grab Saab, and if so, how the presence of a U.S. Navy ship in the waters around Cape Verde will deter or stop that from happening.” There weren’t enough warships to go around as it was, and I needed these vessels on patrol in the Mediterranean.

General Hyten, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said that he and Milley completely agreed. Anderson conveyed this message back to the NSC, to which they responded: “Is the secretary of defense saying he will ignore a